IMMANENCE AND INDIVIDUATION: BRENTANO AND THE SCHOLASTICS ON KNOWLEDGE OF SINGULARS

I. Introduction

When Brentano introduces the notion of immanent objectivity or the intentional inexistence of objects in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, he cites Scholastic theories of intentionality and suggests that his own view is continuous with medieval and ancient theories of *objective being*.[1] Very few philosophers of the middle ages used the terminology of *esse objectivuum* and those that did, such as Peter Aureol, do not appear to be among the primary Scholastic sources for Brentano's theory of immanence.[2] To a modern ear moreover talk of things existing in the mind objectively is confusing. But the contrast which is important for understanding Brentano's theory of intentionality is not that between objectivity and subjectivity as commonly understood nowadays, as if having something objectively in mind excluded its being a subjective phenomenon, but something like Descartes's opposition between that which objectively exists (i.e., is present in the mind or to consciousness as an object) and that which *formally* exists (i.e., is a mode or substance). Hence for Descartes, whose characterization of immanent objectivity Brentano often cited approvingly in his lectures,[3] any two thoughts, for example, a thought about God and a thought about a horse, will have exactly the same formal reality (as modes of the mind) but may differ enormously in their degree of objective being (in the kinds of being they represent).[4]

What Brentano does however inherit from the Scholastics is the general idea that the character of a thought needs to be explicated by reference to what the thought is about where what the thought is about is regarded in *abstraction* from the conditions of actual existence. Hence, the theory of immanence is often described as a doctrine committed to at

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least two kinds of being—being in the mind or being in a spiritual mode and being outside the mind or being in a material mode. From this very division of being are generated the kinds of problems that have exercised both Brentano and his commentators. Such questions as have been treated include: What is the status of intentional objects? Are they things? Does the theory of immanence entail the existence of Meinongian objects? If from something's being an object of thought it follows that it has being, are there such things as round squares which simply of necessity lack existence? If the primary objects of thought are intentional objects, does it follow that any epistemology based upon the theory of immanence must be a form of representational realism?[5] These are important questions but they are not the focus of this paper although what I have to say bears indirectly upon them.

Let us return to the idea for a moment that what is central to the theory of immanence as it is used in Brentano's medieval and ancient sources (chiefly, Aristotle and Aquinas[6]) is that the objects of thought are acquired through a process of *abstraction*. The principle effect of abstraction was generally thought by medieval Aristotelians to be that what the mind acquires is a general concept or *universal*. In other words, what one abstracts from are precisely the conditions which *individuate* an object and what one is left with is an idea which no longer is adequate to represent a particular in a completely determinate fashion. The question then arises: how is it possible to know objects as singulars? What Brentano thus inherits from the Scholastics, along with the theory of immanence, is the problem of individuation.

> But how does it happen that despite the fact that intuitive thought is so thoroughly universal, we can still very firmly maintain that everything which is must be individual . . . ?[7]

How indeed?

The primary aim of this paper is to explain the connection between the theory of immanence in its medieval and Brentanian forms and the problem of individuation. The predominant Scholastic solution to the problem will be compared with Brentano's own "Leibnizian" account of singular knowledge. I shall begin in the next section with a discussion of how the problem arose in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition of the middle ages for it is in this metaphysico-epistemological tradition that

Brentano's work is best located. In Section III, I outline Brentano's theory of immanence in more detail and discuss his proposed analysis of singular knowledge. I shall argue that there can be found in Brentano's later modifications of the theory of immanent objects nominalist tendencies which should have made the task of explaining singular knowledge easier. Brentano's general rejection of nominalism and the residual Aristotelian-Thomistic ideas in his theory of intentionality, however, prevented a full swing to nominalism. In the fourth Section I consider one medieval nominalist solution to the problem of singular knowledge, William of Ockham's, in the light of Brentano's objections to nominalism. It is my contention that not only does Brentano's reading of medieval nominalism contain a fundamental misunderstanding, but that his own philosophy of mind requires the possibility of direct, non-abstractive epistemic access to individuals. Thus in the final Section I discuss how an adequate theory of the unity of consciousness requires an adequate account of our knowledge of singulars.

II. The Problem of Individuation and Aquinas on Singular Knowledge

"The problem of individuation" is actually a gloss for two problems: one metaphysical; the other epistemological. Although it is the latter in which I am interested, the two problems are to some extent inseparable. Puzzles about individuation arose in the Middle Ages from a popular reading of Aristotle's doctrine of universal hylomorphism. For on one reading of Aristotle, every material being or ensouled body is a composite of matter and form. Forms can be more or less specific (compare *animality* and *humanity*) and are the active principles of beings. They explain what makes a thing the kind of thing it is. Prime matter is pure potentiality and must be actualized by form in order to exist. Within this picture there are no individual essences or forms. Socrates has the same substantial form as Plato.[8] So if one asks what differentiates Socrates from Plato, the answer cannot appeal to a difference in form.

This is not the only way to read Aristotle. On some readings the identity of individual forms is not presupposed.[9] But it does seem to be the reading which generated the problem of individuation in the Middle Ages.[10] The orthodox response among many medieval Aristotelians, in

particular those influenced by Aquinas, was to hold that matter is the individuating principle. There is some textual support for their reading of Aristotle in Aristotle's texts. For example, at *Metaphysics*, V, 1016 b 31–3, Aristotle writes;

> Again, some things are one in number, others in species, others in genus, others by analogy; in number those whose matter is one, in species those whose formula is one. . . . [11]

Intuitively, matter would seem to be as poor an individuator as form since matter too is shared by all hylomorphic entities. The doctrine of individuation by matter was refined by the time of Aquinas' *De ente et essentia* to mean not that matter *per se* but "designated matter" or "that which is considered under determined dimensions" is the individuating principle.[12] This should not be taken to imply that for Aquinas things are individuated by their particular spatiotemporal location. Any particular dimensions are accidents and things are not individuated by their accidents.[13] Designated matter can't be described; it can at most be pointed at. Socrates has this matter; Plato that. That is all that can be said of the difference between them.

The idea that matter individuates came under criticism later in the medieval period particularly in the work of Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. Scotus, for example, argued that, being a passive principle, matter cannot individuate objects. Nor is the *quantity* (being itself a formal notion) of matter an individual has necessarily unique to it.[14] But for Ockham, as we shall see below, the epistemological problems were as acute as the metaphysical ones.

Matter was not for either Aristotle or Scholastics like Aquinas something of which the intellect could have direct knowledge.[15] Indeed, it is a good question how we come to have an idea of matter at all. Brentano also seems to have thought of the abstraction involved in the acquisition of intentional objects as abstraction from matter. In a footnote to the discussion of the intentional inexistence of objects in the *Psychology*, Brentano describes Aristotle as endorsing the idea insofar as he held that sense contains the sensed object and the intellect, the thing thought, minus its matter.[16] The important point for our purposes is that it follows from this that things individuated by matter can only be thought about in universal terms. Partly in order to account for our knowledge of univer-

sals, Aquinas had argued that the intellect understands by abstracting universal forms (intelligible species) from their individuating material conditions.[17] The process of acquiring knowledge begins with the senses which receive the forms of things through the medium. These forms are already abstracted from their material conditions in individual extramental objects and exist in a spiritual mode in the medium (air). The received forms come to have new individuating material conditions in the material sense organs including the imagination which stores these sensible species as *phantasms*. The agent intellect must perform another abstraction to bring these species before the mind so that they may stand for or signify not just the particular extramental cause but for any extramental thing with the same substantial form. The intellect does not conceive of individual things as individuals in this process.[18]

> It must be said that our intellect cannot know directly and primarily the singular in material things. The reason for this is that the principle of singularity in material things is individual matter; but our intellect, as was said above, understands by abstracting an intelligible species from matter of this kind. That which is abstracted however from individual matter is universal. Whence our intellect understands directly only the universal.[19]

What would it be to "know the singular in material things"? And how does that differ from knowing the individual through universals? I propose that we think of the distinction in terms of whether or not a particular act of knowledge is ontologically *dependent* upon a particular individual for its being the very thought that it is. Even if a general thought about the nature of equinity is caused by the presence of a particular horse, Brunellus, it is clear that the very same thought could have existed had any other horse been the triggering cause. But a singular thought about Brunellus is dependent upon the identity of Brunellus. It is this notion of dependency which is captured in the contemporary idea that singular propositions are literally *constituted* in part by the individuals referred to in them. I am not here endorsing this conception of singular propositions. But whatever conception of singular propositions one accepts, it is fair to say that for Aquinas the intellect cannot be in direct relationship with individuals in the way required to formulate singular propositions.

How then does Aquinas propose to solve the epistemological puzzle of singular knowledge? Since we cannot know individuals through the

concept of matter, the fact that things are individuated by matter is of no help in solving this problem. Yet Aquinas had to be as keen as anyone else in the history of philosophy to establish the possibility of singular knowledge. For he was a metaphysical nominalist who held that outside the mind only individuals exist. He was also explicitly what we would call a direct realist. Even though speculative knowledge is always universal, it should not be taken to be *about* species rather than extramental individuals.[20] "*Species intelligibilis non est quod intelligitur, sed id quo intelligit intellectus.*"[21] Individual material objects are thus the first and proper objects of knowledge. The ability to cognitively individuate objects was also regarded as crucial in practical reasoning, the cornerstone of both Aristotelian and Thomistic ethics.[22]

In response to the epistemological problem of individuation Aquinas argued that the intellect *indirectly* understands singulars. Singular knowledge occurs when the intellect "reverts" to the phantasms (*convertendo se ad phantasmata*) through a process of reflection.[23] In *De Veritate*, I, q.2, 6, Aquinas introduces an interesting analogy with mirror images to clarify this point. A mirror image is a likeness of the particular thing being mirrored just as the phantasm is a likeness of the individual upon which it is causally dependent.

> [T]he likeness (*similitudo*) which is perceptible in sense is abstracted from the thing as from a knowable object (*cognoscibili*) and, therefore, through that likeness the thing itself *per se* is known directly. The likeness which is in the intellect however is not abstracted from the phantasm as from a knowable object but as from a medium of cognition, in the manner in which our senses perceive the likeness of a thing in a mirror; as long as they are directed (*fertur*) toward it (the likeness) not as if toward a certain thing but as toward a likeness of a thing. . . .[24]

We can attend to a mirror image of a human and say "this is a human" and in doing so we are not referring to the mirror image but to the individual mirrored. Nonetheless, we would still be thinking of the individual under the sortal "human." Similarly, Aquinas claims that by attending to the phantasm itself we can be said to know the singular of which the phantasm is a particular likeness.

To what extent, however, does the doctrine of reverting to phantasms or sensory presentations establish *intellectual* knowledge of singulars? At *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 86, 1, Aquinas writes;

> Indirectly, however, and through a certain sort of reflection (the intellect) is able to know the singular: because, as was said above, even after it has abstracted intelligible species, accordingly, it is unable to understand them (singulars) by an act unless it turns itself towards the phantasms in which, as is said, it understands intelligible species. In this way, therefore, (the intellect) understands the universal itself directly through an intelligible species; it understands singulars however indirectly, of which there are phantasms. *And in this manner the intellect forms this proposition: 'Socrates is human.'* [my emphasis][25]

Does Aquinas here establish that the intellect can, after all, entertain singular propositions? I think not. The sentence 'Socrates is human' should not, if Aquinas is to remain consistent, be understood to be expressing a singular proposition in the contemporary sense. 'Socrates' in this sentence more than likely serves as an abbreviation for a general descriptive concept. As Norman Kretzmann has argued, Aquinas' point seems to be that whereas the intellect contemplates the object through universals, the *sensory context* fixes which individual is being understood. Thus we are entitled to think of the soul as a whole as formulating the proposition 'Socrates is human.'[26] This interpretation is supported by passages such as that at *De Veritate* I, q.2, 6 where Aquinas denies that any *particular* cognitive faculty knows singulars.

> For properly speaking neither sense nor intellect knows, rather the human being knows through each of the two. . . .[27]

This account of singular knowledge enjoyed a long and relatively unchallenged position in medieval philosophy. Even vehement critics of Aquinas's epistemology such as Henry of Ghent accepted the basic idea that the intellect was concerned with universals and the sense with singulars.[28] But it is far from obvious that Aquinas succeeded in establishing intellectual knowledge of singulars. At most he seems entitled to claim that there is sensory representation of singulars. One can see how the intellect might be said to know indirectly singulars if it were able to form some singular proposition about either the object itself or the phantasm itself. If I am grasping a cup and think "*This* thing causing my sensation is warm" or "Whatever is causing *this* sensation is warm" then I am thinking about individuals. But in both these cases my thought and not merely my senses take an individual as object. If I can only think

"Whatever is causing a sensation of warmness here and now is warm," I have not succeeded in identifying in thought any individual.

Finally, the claim that the human being as a whole has intellectual knowledge of singulars, although intriguing, needs further defense. Aquinas asks us to accept that the whole soul has singular knowledge even though no faculty is capable of formulating anything like a singular proposition and when it is not clear how the faculties are integrated. So we should perhaps be wary of concluding that the Thomistic solution to the problem of individuation is an adequate one. And yet the idea that the sensory context fixes which individual is being thought about has persisted to this day most obviously in the revival of causal theories of reference.[29] Interestingly, it was this aspect of Thomistic accounts of singular knowledge which was adamantly rejected by Brentano.

III: Brentano on Universal and Singular Knowledge

I have already mentioned how Brentano's Aristotelian commitments to the form/matter distinction and to the abstractionist theory of immanence place him in a similar position as Aquinas with respect to the problem of individuation. Brentano was also a metaphysical nominalist and direct realist.[30] Thus he too had reasons to offer some solution to the problem of individuation. There are three aspects of Brentano's mature epistemology which are relevant to the topic of singular knowledge. His official solution (the "Leibnizian" move which I discuss towards the end of this section) is not, to my mind, either all that interesting or likely to hold water. But the reasons why this was in effect his only option—his alternative account of abstraction and his rejection of intuitionist accounts of singular knowledge—are interesting and important to understanding his theory of intentionality generally.

If intentional or immanent objects are universals, as Brentano seems to think, one might well begin by asking why they don't correspond to common or universal natures and accidents. Are not universals *things* which in the mind have one kind of universality (abstracted from matter) and in the world have another kind of universal being (enmattered)? Not according to Brentano at least in his later writings. It was not only the worries with standard Meinongian examples (round squares, Pegasus,

etc.) but a concern for the ontological status of *abstracta* (redness, size, justice, humanity, etc.) which led Brentano to modify his account of intentional objects.[31]

The key to understanding the notion of intentional inexistence as developed in the later works rests with understanding Brentano's claim that words used to designate the objects of thought are not "autosemantic."[32] Objects of thought are not distinct from the acts of thinking. Names designating objects of thought belong in the category of *synsemantic* or, to use a medieval expression, *syncategorematic* terms, a category traditionally reserved for the logical constants of a language (e.g., truth-functional and non-truth-functional connectives, quantifiers and articles). Sentences of the form 'I am thinking of Pegasus' are meaningful (and hence have a truth-value) but not because all of the nominative expressions have referents. A name like 'Pegasus' should not be treated as a name of an *ens rationis*.

> [A]lthough whenever a word is used it is related to a meaning, there are still differences in the way this comes about, since many words can be used by themselves, but some can only be used in conjunction with other words, and are so designated as merely synsemantic (*mitbedeutende*) words.[33]

The same point applies to universals. Brentano's "concession to nominalism" was to regard universals not as things but as "delusions" or "fictions of speech" which should be taken to describe the incomplete way in which the mind is thinking about objects.[34] When we talk of universals as objects of thought we are, thus, not naming objects in anything like the way we name real objects. In reality we are thinking only *in modo recto* of someone thinking and of the thing thought *in modo obliquo*. Brentano draws on an analogy with qualities. Size, redness, thinking or shape do not exist by themselves nor can they be thought of by themselves. If these were really distinct from the object with the size, colour and shape, then they should be able to exist independently of those objects. Similarly, if the object of thought were really distinct from the thinker, it too should be capable of independent existence. But that, Brentano claims, is absurd.[35] The size or shape of an object is not something over and above or added to an object nor is it a part of an object. To think of the size of something is to think of the thing as having a certain size. Similarly, to think of an object of thought is to think of someone (oneself, for example) having a certain thought.

> [W]hen we affirm something as thought-of, the truth of the matter is that we are really doing nothing but acknowledging someone thinking of it.[36]

The way in which Brentano's theory of intentionality developed thus led to a striking difference between his approach and the Scholastic account he earlier took himself to be modelling. For Aquinas, intentional beings *are* the forms themselves and universal concepts *are* autosemantic; they do not merely describe the thinker but have an independent being. Indeed, they exist independently of particular thinkers as forms in the medium. What is curious is why Brentano did not take his "concession to nominalism" on this issue further. By treating universals as synsemantic, he can be seen to have effectively freed himself from the Thomistic idea that there needs to be some kind of identity (formal for Aquinas) between intentional objects and the extramental objects from which these *intentiones* are abstracted. This could have allowed Brentano to regard at least *some* ideas as ideas of individuals. But Brentano remained steadfastly committed to the generality-of-thought hypothesis.

What prevented Brentano from moving further in the direction of nominalism? I submit that there were two key factors in Brentano's epistemology which made nominalism unpalatable to him. The first was his conviction that no representation by virtue of its intrinsic properties can be said to be *necessarily* of one individual rather than another. In terms expressed earlier, no representation *depends* on the existence of a particular thing for its being the representation it is, although as we shall see a representation for Brentano may accidentally be adequate to just one thing. The second and related point is that Brentano never seems to have relinquished the idea that thought is essentially an abstractive process and hence cannot yield ideas of singulars. Let us examine each of these points in more detail, beginning with the second.

An important difference between Brentano and medieval Scholastics like Aquinas is that abstraction is not, according to Brentano, a progression from a sensory presentation or intuition of an individual to a more general concept.[37] Sensory presentations of objects from which ideas are abstracted *are themselves also general forms of consciousness*. Mental phenomena do not at any level present the singularity of a thing.[38] This aspect of Brentano's theory also distances his view from Kant's. According to the so-called "containment theory of predication," abstrac-

tion is a matter of extracting general ideas which are contained in sensory intuition. Brentano denied this on the grounds that the forms abstracted are rarely if ever present in the intuition.[39] For example, we abstract the idea of a triangle through perceiving drawn figures none of which are strictly speaking triangles.[40]

What then is the process by which the mind acquires knowledge of universals? Brentano's answer amounted to a rethinking of the psychological processes involved in abstraction. Abstraction, he argued, relies on our capacity to notice differences and make comparisons between things, to detect the "continual approximating of an extreme" among objects and to draw "multiple inferences," for example, when we abstract ideas about the positions of points in a line from our concept of a straight line.[41] Abstraction involves thinking of "something relative"; for example, the comparison between a number of red things is necessary for the formation of the concept of redness.[42] Through the process of abstraction we are thus able to form a general concept indifferent to individual differences. We also acquire the "disposition" to think of a universal in the absence of an appropriate particular and without performing the operations of comparison, etc., which were involved in the construction of the disposition.[43]

But if we must make comparisons, notice differences, etc., in order to form a general idea, just *what* are we supposed to be comparing? How is it possible to engage in the mental act of comparing objects without representing those objects under sortal concepts? Since, for Brentano, all thought is universal, it would seem that the very processes of comparison require us already to have universal concepts. *Prima facie* it would be easier to understand how the mind abstracts general concepts by comparing individual presentations. But if these presentations are themselves already general forms of consciousness, the role played by abstraction Brentano describes cannot be that which explains the formation of *all* our concepts, though it might explain the formation of some, for example, higher-order universals (*genera*) like *colour* and *shape* or relations between universals such as *humans are more like asses than stones.*

Let us now turn to Brentano's reasons for adopting this strong stance against presentations, sensory or otherwise, of individuals. To restate the historical reasons, Brentano's position derives in part from his Scholastic reading of Aristotelian metaphysics. He notes that we do not have a presentation of "the individual determination of a substance" which also

individualizes the accidents and thus we are forced to think of everything in universal terms.[44] However Brentano also offers a very interesting argument against the idea that the senses yield us knowledge of singulars. The reason given is that:

> [W]e can, without contradiction, imagine that another being has the very same determination as the being that we perceive. Thus someone else could have the same visual presentations, the same sensory judgements and sensory affects. So these things do not constitute the individuality of that which we inwardly perceive.[45]

Let us see how this objection works in the context of Aquinas's account of singular knowledge. It is true that Aquinas says little about the mechanics of reverting to the phantasms and, as we have seen, much hangs for Aquinas on the claim that the phantasm is a likeness (*similitudo*) of just one thing. If this is the right way to read Aquinas, the analysis of singular knowledge will surely fail. For what explains singular reference cannot be the mere likeness between the phantasm and object. As Brentano notes, similarity is ubiquitous. If a mirror image or visual presentation is a likeness of Fred, it is as much a likeness of Ned, his identical twin, and two people can have the same kind of visual presentation and be thinking about distinct objects. Worse still for Aquinas, similarity between phantasms and extramental objects cannot *ground* our sensory knowledge of singulars because similarity is itself understood in terms of the identity of forms. It is because the phantasm has the same form as the object sensed that it is a likeness of it. But forms are universal and hence the phantasm cannot be the likeness of just one thing.

Now one might object at this point that forms, as they exist in phantasms, are *not* universal since they exist in the matter of the sense organs. But this does not help Aquinas's case because if the form of the phantasm is individualized and so bears no *intrinsic* relation to the form of the extramental object it is harder still to see why it should represent that and only that object. For Brentano's objection to hold however it has to be established that the resemblance between a phantasm and an object is being proposed in this kind of theory as a *sufficient* condition for the phantasm's being a representation of that particular individual. Aquinas's texts neither confirm nor disconfirm this claim. Nonetheless, it is easy to see how the theory might be modified to avoid Brentano's criticism. All one need do is assert that for the phantasm to represent just one thing it

must both resemble that thing *and be caused by it*. The price paid here is that one is forced to regard the causal relation between the phantasm and its object as a necessary rather than contingent relation. But one could argue that this is an acceptable cost (which many today are prepared to pay) to establish the ontological dependency of a representation upon an individual. If one reads Aquinas as asserting both these conditions as necessary for singular reference, then one will not accept Brentano's claim (above) that "someone else could have the same visual presentations. . . . " about individuals other than those one is visually representing. For it would follow that a phantasm could not have a different cause and be the same phantasm.

Of course, once one begins to admit a causal criterion for mental representation the need for a representation to resemble what it represents becomes less obvious. Contemporary causal theories of reference, for example, do not require that a representation instantiate any of the qualities of the object. In order to represent an individual it is thus not necessary to perform any formal abstraction since one is not necessarily *re-presenting* any property of the object by which to represent it. We shall return to this point below when we address Brentano's relationship to the nominalist tradition.

Let us turn now to Brentano's own account of singular knowledge. Knowledge of individuals does not, he argues, involve immanent singular objects—such an idea is incoherent for him for the reasons just given—rather, individuals are conceptualized in thoroughly universal terms. Brentano thus developed a Leibnizian model of individual concepts in which conceiving of an individual is nothing more than "synthesizing" a complex idea from ideas of the individual's properties. A representation of an individual on Leibniz's (mature) theory can be understood as a maximally consistent set of universals.[46] An "individual" object of thought for Brentano is thus nothing more than a "complete" object of thought in the sense that for every property expressed by a universal, P, the object either has P or not-P. To have ideas of distinct individuals the difference between their properties must be present to consciousness.

> The answer is that the concept of there being two beings implies that we do not mean by the one what we mean by the other. Only in this way would there be one thing and another. To be sure, they must both have in common the property of being a "thing" and they may have other properties in

> common as well, but when one is thought of in terms of an exhausitive definition, it must be presented in some way that the other is not. . . . In view of the above, it is not difficult to see how we can think of an individual thing in an unintuitive way, however, even though we are incapable of thinking intuitively of it.[47]

Brentano appears to be betting on the impossibility of completely indiscernible individuals. As bets go, the odds are not in Brentano's favour. Whilst most philosophers accept one side of Leibniz's Law, namely, the indiscernibility of identicals, few are willing to accept the converse, the identity of indiscernibles. Philosophers in the Middle Ages also divided on this metaphysical issue and different metaphysical commitments gave rise to different epistemological accounts. Those who thought that there could be objects indiscernible in both essence and accidents tended to reject the view that individuals could be known entirely under general aspects. Scotus, for example, argued that there could be individual differences which are not differences of form and as such are not detectable by us. God could make two indiscernible whitenesses occupying the same region of visual space but each with a distinct thisness (*haecceitas*) or individual difference (*differentia individualis*). The sun's rays, Scotus thought, present us with a real example of indiscernible individuals.[48]

Scotus and, subsequently, Ockham represent a tradition in medieval thought which denied that individuals can be reduced to compounds of universals. While Scotus remained a realist about common or universal nature (*natura communis*), Ockham developed a rigorous nominalism according to which nothing is universal. Both views, however, acknowledged the distinction between general and individual concepts and a theoretical space opened in which it was thought possible to have direct knowledge of individuals unmediated by universals. In the next section I shall outline Brentano's objections to this alternative approach to singular knowledge.

IV: Brentano and Ockham on Nominalism and Knowledge of Singulars

Brentano dictated his last letter on March 9th, 1917, eight days before his death. In this letter he mentions the "Medieval Nominalists" and scorns their denial of universals one last time. One could say that the nominalist threat was something Brentano would fight to the death. The

depth of what Brentano knew of medieval nominalism is difficult to establish with certainty but we can at least establish the breadth. Brentano's contribution to Möehler's (1867) *Kirchengeschichte*, a chapter on the history of the ecclesiastical sciences he composed using notes of Moehler's while he was still a Catholic priest and young professor at the German University of Würzburg, the subsequent *Die Vier Phasen der Philosophie*,[49] where Brentano outlines further his theory that the evolution of philosophy is marked by transitions between four repetitive phases, and his lecture notes from between 1867 and 1870[50] are perhaps our best sources for investigating what Brentano knew about medieval nominalism. The lectures, which appear to have been based in part on the chapter from Möehler, provide an overview of nominalism from Roscelin and Abelard in the twelfth century, through Aureol and the Dominican, Durandus Saint-Porcain in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century to William of Champeaux and Ockham in the fourteenth century.[51] Brentano was apprised also of modern accounts of nominalism, especially Berkeley's. And we might speculate that Brentano's identifying the nominalisms of the Middle Ages with those of the moderns contributed to his making a fundamental though not uncommon mistake about the medieval nominalists.

The error is summed up in one line from Brentano's last letter:

> The existence of general ideas is denied not only by the Medieval Nominalists, but by famous modern philosophers as well, Berkeley in particular.[52]

There are two ways of understanding the notion of a general idea. If we take a general idea to be an idea of some thing which is universal in nature, as the realist does, then a medieval nominalist will not accept the existence of general ideas. But there is another way to construe the notion of a general idea and that is as an idea which stands for or signifies or represents more than one thing. In this respect, a nominalist can perfectly well accept the existence of general ideas.

Berkeley was not sensitive to this distinction in part because his own theory of ideas as images ruled out the second interpretation. Thus in his criticism of Locke on *abstracta*, Berkeley takes himself to be denying the existence of general ideas. He asks, sceptically, in *The Principles of Human Knowledge*:

> What more easy [sic] than for anyone to look a little into his own thoughts, and there try whether he has . . . an idea that shall correspond with the description . . . of the general idea of a triangle, which is "neither oblique nor rectangle, equilateral, equicrural nor scalenon, but all or none of these at once"?[53]

But without the assumption that a general idea must be an image of all the things which fall under it, this objection does not hold. In any event, if Berkeley were representative of nominalism generally, then Brentano's criticisms of nominalism would be devastating. For as Brentano points out, "without general ideas, it would not be possible to have general judgements or demonstrative proofs."[54] This was an objection familiar to medieval nominalists. It was generally thought that to have the status of scientific propositions, definitions by *genus* and *differentiae* must have universal application. A second objection advanced by Brentano accused the nominalists of being unable to distinguish between equivocity and generality. If we can only cognitively represent individuals, then any general term is simply ambiguous and ambiguity precludes the possibility of scientific generalizations.

> The [nominalist] beliefs that we cannot think of universals, and that so-called general terms are only associated with a multitude of individual presentations have also been refuted. This would make them equivocal terms and a single proof for a truth expressed in general terms would be impossible.[55]

But Berkeley is *not* representative and medieval nominalists did *not* deny the existence of general ideas in the second sense referred to above. Brentano's criticisms can thus be easily defused. Indeed, Ockham anticipated both of Brentano's objections and offered the following responses.

First, the denial of universals in nature did not, according to Ockham, signify an end to science or its reliance on definition and demonstration. Every science, real or rational (e.g., logic), is primarily concerned not with *universal nature*, which does not exist, but with *universal propositions*. To say 'Humans are rational animals' is to define the *term* 'human'. Science is not however concerned merely with language but with the truth-makers for universal propositions. The proposition 'Humans are rational animals' is true if and only if each and every individual which the term 'human' signifies (and *supposits* for in the proposition) is an individual which the *definiens* 'rational animal' signifies (and *supposits* for in

the proposition). For the proposition to be true no appeal need be made to common natures but no denial of general ideas is required either.[56]

In response to the second objection, Ockham denied the existence of ambiguous *concepts*.[57] Ambiguity is possible in spoken or written language but an ambiguous name must be subordinated (Ockham's term for the asymmetric semantic dependency of a conventional term on a concept) to distinct concepts. For example, the name 'bank' is ambiguous because it can be used on different occasions to express different concepts (e.g., the concept of a financial institution or the concept of the side of a river). Proper names in spoken and written language like 'Socrates' may also be ambiguous. By contrast, a general name like 'human' is subordinated to just one concept and hence is unambiguous. None of this prevents the concept from signifying indifferently all individual humans.[58] There is thus nothing in the doctrine of nominalism which collapses the distinction between general and ambiguous terms.

Brentano's criticisms of nominalism do, however, have more bite against those versions of nominalism which remained attached to the theory of immanent objects. In this camp we can include Berkeley—since there is no being not even a being of thought which is a triangle but neither equilateral, scalenon, etc., there can be no general idea of triangularity—but also an early theory of Ockham's which Brentano seems to have had in mind in his comments on Ockham's nominalism.[59] Although initially attracted to the idea of immanent objects, the so-called "*fictum*" theory, Ockham went on to reject formal identity between intramental and extramental objects as basic to either semantics or epistemology.[60] The later *intellectio* theory defines thoughts as mental acts which do not represent the world through the mediation of intentional objects. This shift combined with the hypothesis that there is a mental language provided the foundations for Ockham's nominalism. Concepts, in the strictest sense, are *terms* and just as there can be general terms in spoken or written language so too there can be general terms in mental language.

In the medieval nominalist tradition individuals were thus pushed into prominence as the primary objects of thought. Everything, substances *and* qualities, was thought of as individual. It is not surprising, therefore, that the problem of singular knowledge did not present itself. Following Scotus, Ockham developed an empiricism in which our first cognitive experiences of the world are *intuitive cognitions* of individuals. An intuitive

cognition is a cognition in which an individual is known to exist and which signifies that individual alone. General concepts are arrived at by abstraction (in *abstractive cognitions*) from intuitive cognitions. Abstraction, for Ockham, is therefore a process of moving from singular to general knowledge.

> It is not as some say that these (abstractive) concepts preexist the intuitive notion of a human being, rather this is the process. First a human is apprehended (*cognoscitur*) by some particular sense, then that same human is apprehended by the intellect and when (the human being) has been conceived, a general notion common to all humans is formed. This apprehension (*cognitio*) is called a concept, intention or passion which is a common concept for all humans and when it exists in the intellect, the intellect immediately knows that a human is something without any process of reasoning (*sine discursu*). Then, another animal having been distinguished from a human or from another animal, one general notion is elicited for every animal, and that general notion for every animal is called a passion or intention of the soul or the common concept for every animal.[61]

The same process applies in the case of qualities. A cognizer first acquires a concept for Socrates's particular paleness and a concept for Plato's particular paleness and then abstracts the general concept of paleness. Notice that since, contrary to Brentano, it is not assumed that we begin with a general representation of an individual, there is no need to suppose that at this stage any sortal concepts are required. Indeed, for Ockham, abstractive cognitions presuppose the intuitive cognitions of singulars; not *vice versa*.[62]

It might seem that until we can determine whether or not concepts in the *intellectio* theory are imagistic we cannot assume that Ockham succeeded in meeting the kinds of objections Brentano raises. Saying that a concept is a term does not rule out resemblance as a *necessary* condition for signification. But I suspect that, at least in Ockham's later *intellectio* theory, it was causation rather than resemblance which was thought to ground representation. This claim is supported by an important passage in which Ockham imagines how we would settle what one was thinking about when one's cognition of a singular is as similar to one as to the other of an indiscernible pair. There he claims the following:

> I say . . . that an intuitive cognition is proper to a singular, not on account of a greater likeness (*assimilationem*) to one than to another, but because it is

> naturally caused by one and not by the other, and cannot be caused by the other.[63]

Notice that an intuitive cognition caused by a singular cannot be caused by any other singular and still be the same idea. This satisfies our earlier requirement that singular knowledge involves some kind of dependency on the identity of the individual which gives rise to it. General knowledge does not. Indeed from this we can infer that what makes something a general idea is that it can be caused by any individual of the same kind.

V: Conclusion

Brentano was right, historically, to point out that the medieval nominalists never eclipsed Thomism as the dominant way of thinking about these issues.[64] Why, for example, Ockham's epistemology did not foster a long tradition or influence the phenomenological movement in the way that theories based on the notion of immanent objectivity did is a fascinating historical question. Why the assumption that thought is essentially general is still so popular today, even among those (e.g., Quine) who are committed to nominalism as a metaphysical doctrine, is also a mystery. There are of course contrary trends. Recent work on indexical knowledge and proper names has demonstrated the difficulty of trying to eliminate singular terms from thought and language.[65] I would like to conclude by pointing out how an adequate theory of singular knowledge is also important to the study of the mind.

As Brentano argued in his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, experience shows us that we are often mentally directed towards the same individual object, for example, when we think of or have a presentation of an object and desire or love it at the same time.[66] The unity of consciousness in turn presupposes that we are able to identify a continuous self (the 'I' of experience) as the subject of experience.

> The unity of consciousness, as we know with evidence through inner perception, consists in the fact that all mental phenomena which occur within us simultaneously . . . all belong to one unitary reality only if they are inwardly perceived as existing together. They constitute phenomenal parts of a mental phenomenon, the elements of which are neither distinct things nor parts of distinct things but belong to a real unity.[67]

It appears crucial to Brentano's account of the unity of consciousness that there be a single, unified subject of inner perception, something which directly apprehends its own mental phenomena and which Brentano links with the notion of a "self." It is conceivable that more than one self can inhabit the same body but what would distinguish these as distinct centres of consciousness is nothing but their restricted access to their own mental phenomena.[68] But we may well ask: Where does the idea of this individual self come from and how does it come to be identifiably *my* self? Described in general terms a self no more belongs to me than to anyone else with the same kinds of acts of consciousness and introspective capacity. Even if one were possessed of a Leibnizian complete idea of a self which happened to describe oneself and only oneself—that is, if one existed objectively in one's own mind—one would not necessarily thereby know oneself unless one knew that such an idea were an idea of one's own self. But in that case one must have some other way of knowing oneself than *via* a completely general idea. It is thus not surprising that Brentano's Scholastic mentors should struggle with the phenomenon of individual self-knowledge. The account of concepts as abstract universals is not amenable to the idea of a singular conception of the self and one cannot rely on a sensory intuition of the self in order to explain self-knowledge.[69]

To conclude, despite the influence Brentano's immanentist philosophy has had on contemporary epistemology and philosophy of mind, the problems associated with singular knowledge should be a sufficient reason for rethinking the need for immanent objects in the theory of intentionality.[70]

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NOTES

1. Franz Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, ed., Oscar Kraus; trans. A. C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell & L. L. McAlister (London: Routledge, 1874/1973), p. 88.

2. On the same page Brentano cites Aristotle, Philo, Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas as sharing roughly the same theory of immanent objects. Typically, however, the terminology of *esse objectivuum* featured more in medieval theories of vision. Medieval perspectivists like Peter Aureol, as Katherine Tachau has shown, used the term *esse objectivuum* to refer to objects which have a mind-dependent kind of being but which are not for all that intramental. Objective *entia* were thought to have 'seen', 'judged' or 'apparent' being and were typically the relata of visual illusions such as the apparent movement of the trees on the bank one is passing or the colours in the dove's neck. Katherine H. Tachau, *Vision and Certitude in The Age of Ockham* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988), pp. 90–91. Brentano appears to have been aware of the text in which Aureol sets down his theory of objective being (*Comm. In lib. IV Sentent*) but makes no explicit reference to Aureol when discussing immanent objects. See Brentano's contribution to J.-A. Möehler's *Kirchengeschichte*, the chapter, "History of the Ecclesiastical Sciences," pp. 467–520 of vol. 2 of the French translation, *Histoire de l'Eglise*, trans. P. Belet (Paris: Gams, 1868–69) at p. 507. Other Scholastics like Aquinas did not make use of the notion *esse objectivuum* but did use the terminology of *esse intentionale* to describe forms as they exist in the mind (intelligible species).

3. See, for example, the lecture delivered to the Vienna Philosophical Society on March 27, 1889, reprinted as "On the Concept of Truth" in Franz Brentano, *The True and the Evident*, ed., Oskar Kraus, trans., Roderick M. Chisholm (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), pp. 15–16.

4. See Descartes's discussion of objective and formal reality in the *Third Meditation* (AT VII, 41), *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. II., eds., John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 28. It should be noted that there are important differences between Descartes's use of the terminology of objective being and Brentano's use in earlier writings like the *Psychology*. Descartes did not allow that ideas of non-existent or impossible objects (e.g., chimaerae) have any degree of objective being, whereas Brentano seems not to have ruled this out. Later, however, Brentano attempted to avoid the conclusion that *impossibilia* (e.g., round squares) have any being. See Section III below.

5. See Ausonio Marras, "Scholastic Roots of Brentano's Conception of Intentionality," in Linda L. McAlister, *The Philosophy of Brentano* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1976), pp. 128–39, and Herbert Spiegelberg, "'Intention' and 'Intentionality' in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl," in McAlister, ed. *The Philosophy of Brentano*, pp. 108–27.

6. See Brentano's *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, p. 88.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 314.

8. Aristotle's account of essence can be found in *Metaphysics* VII in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. 2., Jonathan Barnes, ed.; W. D. Ross, trans. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). The identity between an individual and its essence is discussed in ch. 6.

9. Compare, for example, William Charlton, "Aristotle and the Principle of Individuation," *Phronesis* 17 (1972): 239–49, who questions the standard interpretation of Aristotle as defending individuation by matter, with the more orthodox position represented by A. C. Lloyd, "Aristotle's Principle of Individuation," *Mind* 79 (1970): 519–29.

10. For an overview of medieval solutions to the problem of individuation see Jorge J. E. Gracia, ed., *Individuation in Scholasticism* (New York: SUNY, 1994) and *Introduction*

to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press, 1984).

11. *Metaphysics*, V, 1016 b 31–33 in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. vol. 2., p. 1605.

12. *De ente et essentia*, 2.4. M. D. Roland-Gosselin points out in his translation that the terminology was not new. Aquinas probably took the notion from Boethius and Latin translations of Avicenna. See "Introduction" to *'De ente et essentia' de S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: 1926), 11, n.1; pp. 58–60.

13. See *De ente et essentia*, c.2, 2, and *De Natura Materiae, et Dimensionibus Interminatis*. (*Opusculum* XXVIII.) *Opera Omnia*, vol. XVI (Parma: 1865) p. 343.

14. For Scotus' critique of quantity and matter as individuating principles see questions 4 and 5 of the *Lectura in librum secundum Sententiarum* in *Ioannis Duns Scoti O.F.M., Opera omnia* vol. 18 (Vatican Polyglot Press, 1982). His own account of how common natures are "contracted" to individuals through individual differences (sometimes, *haecceities*) is presented in the sixth question.

15. *De ente et essentia*, c.2, 1.

16. Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, p. 88.

17. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 85, 1. (London: Blackfriars & Eyre and Spottiswood, 1968), vol. 12.

18. *Ibid.*, I, q. 85, 1 and I, q. 86, 1.

19. *Ibid.*, I, q. 86, 1: 'Dicendum quod singulare in rebus materialibus intellectus noster directe et primo cognoscere non potest. Cuius ratio est, quia principium singularitatis in rebus materialibus est materia individualis: intellectus autem noster, sicut supra dictum est, intelligit abstrahendo speciem intelligibilem ab huiusmodi materia. Quod autem a materia individuali abstrahitur est universale. Unde intellectus noster directe non est cognoscitivus nisi universalem."

20. See Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 86, 1; I, q. 87, 1 and *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate* in *Opera Omnia* XXII, I (Rome: Leonine Commission, 1975); hereafter *De Veritate* I, q. 2, 6.

21. *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 85, 2.

22. *Ibid.*, III, q. 11, 1.

23. *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 86, 1; *De Veritate*, I, q. 2, 6.

24. *De Veritate*, I, q. 2, 6, lin. 68–77: "similitudo quae est in sensu abstrahitur a re ut ab obiecto cognoscibili, et ideo per similitudo autem quae est in intellectu non abstrahitur a phantasmate sicut ab obiecto cognoscibili sed sicut a medio cognitionis, per modum quo sensus noster accipit similitudinem rei quae est in speculo dum fertur in eam non ut in rem quandam sed ut in similitudinem rei. . . . "

25. *Summa Theologiae*, I.86.1: "Indirecte autem, et quasi per quandam reflexionem, potest cognoscere singulare: quia, sicut supra dictum est, etiam postquam species intelligibiles abstraxit, non potest secundum eas actu intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, in quibus species intelligibiles intelligit, ut dicitur. Sic igitur ipsum universale per speciem intelligibilem directe intelligit; indirecte autem singularia, quorum sunt phantasmata. Et hoc modo format hanc propositionem, Socrates est homo."

26. Norman Kretzmann, in "Philosophy of Mind," ch. 5 of *The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas*, Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) argues that the intellect "can know an individual *through* its nature, can know that what is being felt here and now is intense heat. . . . " (p. 142) This characterization suggests that what the intellect has in mind is a general description which in

conjunction with indexicals and the operation of the senses fixes the individual being thought about. But this does not entail that the intellect formulates a singular proposition.

27. *De Veritate*, I, q. 2, 6 lin. 131–33: "non enim proprie loquendo sensus aut intellectus cognoscunt sed homo per utrumque. . . ."

28. See J. V. Brown, "Henry of Ghent on Internal Sensation," in *Journal of the History of Philosophy* vol. 10 (1972): 15–28.

29. See Saul Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972).

30. Brentano's argument for metaphysical nominalism took the form of a *reductio ad absurdum*. To deny that only individuals exist would lead to self-contradiction he argued, because insofar as we think of two things exactly alike in all determinate properties they either cannot be two (because there is no difference between them in which case we have a contradiction), or if they are two they cannot be exactly alike and so our original supposition is false. See Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, pp. 320–21 and p. 314. The argument does not, however, support the conclusion for it does not show that *only* individuals exist. Russell, for example, would have accepted that there are individuals and that we can distinguish them in thought but that they are composed entirely of compresent universals. See Bertrand Russell, *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1948), pp. 294–97. Brentano's direct realism can be seen in his opposition to psychologism and scepticism. See *The True and the Evident*, pp. 110–11 and *Die Vier Phasen der Philosophie*, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968) p. 15.

31. Oskar Kraus credits Brentano's correspondence with Marty (1901–06) as motivating Brentano's redefinition of the so-called "form words" or *abstracta* as synsemantic expressions. See *The True and the Evident*, pp. 161–62; 177–79.

32. See Kraus's n. 11, p. 89 and his Introduction to the 1924 ed'n. of *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, p. 400. For a critical examination of Brentano's claim to be avoiding reification of intentional objects see Richard E. Aquila, "The Status of Intentional Objects," *New Scholasticism* 45 (1971): 427–56.

33. Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, p. 332.

34. Brentano, *The True and the Evident*, p. 64.

35. Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, p. 322 and p. 333.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 333.

37. Franz Brentano, *Sensory and Noetic Consciousness*, Oscar Kraus, ed.; trans. M. Schatte & L. L. McAlister (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1929/1981), p. 64. See also Kraus's Introduction to the 1924 ed'n. of *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, p. 375.

38. Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, p. 311.

39. Brentano, *Sensory and Noetic Consciousness*, p. 67.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 67.

41. *Ibid.*, pp. 68–70.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 71.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 71.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 66.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 60; p. 66. See also Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, p. 311.

46. For a critique of Leibniz's view see Robert Adams, "Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity," *Journal of Philosophy* 76 (1979): 5–f26.

47. Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, p. 314.

48. According to the cosmology of the fourteenth century, the sun revolved and, as it did, each ray of sunlight was replaced by the next but in a fashion which appears to us as a continuous single stream of light. See Duns Scotus, *Lectura*, fq. 1, 24.

49. Franz Brentano, *Die Vier Phasen der Philosophie*, p. 15. See Etienne Gilson, "Brentano's Interpretation of Medieval Philosophy," in McAlister, ed., *The Philosophy of Brentano*; pp. 56–67 for a critique of Brentano's account of the history of medieval philosophy.

50. Preserved in his Nachlass (Ms H 45), "Geschichte der Philosophie (Altes Kolleg)" Houghton Library, Harvard University, and edited by Klaus Hedwig as *Franz Brentano: Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Philosophie* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1980).

51. Whether Brentano read the original texts of the nominalists is unclear given the level of generality in the overview provided in these sources. Hedwig directs our attention, however, to the bibliographical data in Ms H 45 in his edition of the lectures at p. XVII. It strongly suggests that Brentano did not rely on seminary handbooks but upon the most scholarly contemporary histories including those of Haurĕau, Munk, Stöckl and Ueberweg.

52. Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, p. 315.

53. George Berkeley, *Principles, Dialogues and Correspondence*, ed., Colin Murray Turbayne, (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), p. 13.

54. Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, p. 315.

55. Brentano, *Sensory and Noetic Consciousness*, p. 65.

56. William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, I. c. 17. P. Boehner, G. Gal, S. Brown, eds., *Opera Philosophica*, I, (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1974) pp. 14–15.

57. To see why Ockham held this view see my "The Puzzle of Names in Ockham's Theory of Mental Language," *Review of Metaphysics* 50. (Sept. 1996): 79–99.

58. William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, I. c. 17.

59. See Brentano's chapter of Möehler, *Histoire de l'Eglise*, p. 508.

60. Ockham's dissatisfaction with the *fictum* theory was probably provoked by his confrere, Walter Chatton, who questioned the necessity of objects of thought mediating our epistemic access to the world. See Tachau's discussion in *Vision and Certitude in The Age of Ockham*, p. 137ff.

61. Ockham, *Summa Logicae* III. 2. c. 29, lin. 14–22: "Non quod isti conceptus praecedant notitiam intuitivam hominis, sed iste est processus quod primo homo cognoscitur aliquo sensu particulari, deinde ille idem homo cognoscitur ab intellectu, quo cognito habetur una notitia generalis et communis omni homini. Et ista cognitio vocatur conceptus, intentio, passio, quo conceptus communis est omni homini; quo existente in intellectu statim intellectus scit quod homo est aliquid, sine discursu. Deinde apprehenso alio animali ab homine vel aliis animalibus, elicitur una notitia generalis omni animali, et illa notitia generalis omni animali vocatur passio seu intentio animae sive conceptus communis omni animali."

62. See Ockham, *Quodlibeta septem*, Joseph C. Wey, ed. *Opera Theologica*, IX. (St. Bonaventure, NY: 1980): I, q. 8.

63. *Quodlibeta*, I, q. 8: "Ad primum istorum <<dubium>> dico, quod intuitiva est propria cognitio singularis, non propter maiorem assimilationem uni quam alteri, sed quia naturaliter ab uno et non ab altero causatur nec potest ab altero causari."

64. See Brentano's comments in Möehler, *Histoire de l'Eglise*, pp. 510–11.

65. See John Perry, "The Problem of the Essential Indexical," *Noûs* vol. 13 no. 1 (1979): 3–21.

66. Brentano, "On the Unity of Consciousness," in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, pp. 155–76.

67. *Ibid.*, pp. 163–64.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 164.

69. Aquinas was forced to argue that the intellect has only *indirect* knowledge of itself when it reflects on its acts of consciousness. See *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 87 and *De Veritate*, q. 10, 8 and 9. But how this process yields knowledge of *this* self rather than some self or other is a good question. See also Richard Thomas Lambert, "Habitual Knowledge of the Soul in Thomas Aquinas," *The Modern Schoolman*, vol. 60 (1982) : 1–19.

70. I am grateful to the participants of *The Austrian Tradition in Logic* conference at the University of Texas at Austin, April, 1996, Herb Hochberg, and an anonymous referee for their comments and to Nancy Llewellyn Menn for her improvements to my translations.